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A highly skilled workforce is crucial for economic development and growth, especially in knowledge-
based economies [1]. Consequently, work-
ers with education, experience and knowl-
edge have become an important resource 
in the twenty-first century, and govern-
ments have introduced policies to both 
improve education and skills training for 
native workforces and students, and attract 
skilled workers from abroad. Both strate-
gies serve the increasing demand for skilled 
labour, but each has a different timescale. 
Investments in education have significant 
effects mainly in the long term, whereas 
‘importing’ highly skilled migrants has more 
immediate results. Thus, many advanced 
nations—notably the USA, Germany, Swit-
zerland, the UK, Canada and Australia—
increasingly compete internationally to 
attract scientists, engineers and other highly 
educated professionals.
These foreign workers contribute to the 
economy of their host country at least as 
much as natives, according to some stud-
ies. Five of the eight scientists from the USA 
who received Nobel Prizes in 2009 were 
immigrants, and foreign-born researchers 
often outperform natives in terms of their 
contributions to science such as authoring 
influential papers, authoring patents and 
being involved in biotechnology compa-
nies [2]. At the same time, governments are 
also incentivizing highly educated citizens 
to remain in their home country [3]. This is 
not always an easy task. Highly skilled work-
ers are mobile, flexible and more prone 
to emigrate, perhaps because the cost of 
migrating seems to be lower than for less 
skilled workers  [4]. This notwithstanding, 
a high emigration rate is not a problem if it 
is countered by high immigration. In fact, 
what really matters is whether a country can 
achieve a positive ‘balance of brains’—a 
higher inflow of skilled immigrants than the 
outflow of skilled emigrants. An article in 
the Economist highlighted the importance 
of this phenomenon for Italy. “What distin-
guishes Italy from its peers is not the abso-
lute number of its exiled graduates [...], but 
that it has a net ‘brain drain’, something 
more typical of a developing economy. In 
other words, the number of educated Ital-
ians leaving the country exceeds the  number 
of educated foreigners entering it” [5].
What makes some countries more attrac-
tive than others to highly skilled workers? 
Things like the nature of the jobs avail-
able, wages, immigration policies, net-
work effects, standard of life and living 
costs all matter. However, an issue that has 
not yet received much attention—but one 
that is probably important to highly skilled 
 workers— is the prevalence of corruption 
within a given country. First, skilled natives 
will tend to leave corrupt countries and 
move to less corrupt ones where employ-
ment is meritocratic; second, foreign talents 
might not be attracted to a corrupt labour 
market, in which access to high-paying and 
prestigious jobs is determined by political 
affiliations or nepotism. As a consequence, 
corrupt countries might experience a pro-
longed loss in human capital, driven by an 
unfair labour market where string-pulling 
and connections  matter more than skills 
and performance.
To assess empirically the role of cor-ruption in the migration choices of highly skilled workers, we studied 
net flows across 123 countries. By using 
migration data from Docquier et al [6] about 
workers aged 25 years and older with post-
secondary education, we computed migra-
tion flows of foreign skilled workers between 
1990 and 2000. We used the International 
Country Risk Guide corruption index as our 
measure of corruption (www.prsgroup.com/ 
icrg.aspx). The index measures the extent 
to which “high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments” and 
“illegal payments are generally expected 
throughout lower levels of government” in 
the form of “bribes connected with import 
and export licences, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, policy protection or loans” [7]. 
We rescaled the index to increase with cor-
ruption in absolute terms—each country 
received a score from zero to six, of which 
six means no corruption and zero represents 
the  maximum level of corruption.
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…what really matters is whether 
a country can achieve a positive 
‘balance of brains’—a higher 
inflow of skilled immigrants than 
the outflow of skilled emigrants
…corrupt countries might 
experience a prolonged loss in 
human capital, driven by an 
unfair labour market…
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Fig 1 illustrates how countries with low 
corruption levels, such as Germany and the 
UK, benefit from net inflows of high-skilled 
migrants, whereas highly corrupt countries, 
such as Italy or Mexico, experience a net 
outflow. To better study the phenomenon 
behind this descriptive evidence, we per-
formed an additional econometric analysis. 
We regressed the corruption index on the 
net flow of highly skilled migrants weighted 
by population and found a negative corre-
lation (significant at the 1% level in a two-
tailed t-test): highly corrupt countries expe-
rience a net loss of skilled workers (Table 1, 
column  1). The correlation remained  sig-
nificant even when we controlled for gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita (Table 1, 
column 2). The result is therefore not deter-
mined by the fact that countries with rela-
tively high GDP per capita tend to have 
lower corruption levels. Instead, for the 
same GDP per  capita level, corrupt coun-
tries are more likely to experience net 
 outflows of people.
Corruption might affect net migration 
through two channels: first, it might favour 
outflows by pushing highly skilled natives to 
migrate to other less corrupt countries; and 
second, it might hamper inflows by discour-
aging talented foreign workers from immi-
grating. To disentangle these two effects, we 
separately regressed our corruption variable 
on the inflows and outflows, weighted by the 
population (Table 1, column 3, column 5). 
As a robustness check, we controlled for 
GDP per capita (Table  1, column 4, col-
umn 6). The results show a negative and sig-
nificant  correlation—at the 1% significance 
level—between corruption and inflows, 
meaning that the higher the corruption of the 
country, the lower the immigration of foreign 
skilled workers. At the same time, there is a 
positive and significant correlation—at the 
5% significance level, but only when con-
trolling for GDP per capita—between cor-
ruption and outflow, indicating that skilled 
people are more likely to move abroad if 
their  country of origin is highly corrupt.
Thus, the net loss of talented work-
ers seems to be driven by both the lack of 
incoming and increased outgoing skilled 
workers. However, the first effect seems to 
be stronger in terms of the magnitude, sta-
tistical significance and explanatory power 
of the model. More specifically, whilst we 
observe a high, explained variance of the 
dependent variable (R2 = 0.27 and R2 = 0.32, 
respectively) in the inflow regressions 
(Table 1 column 3, column 4), the model 
has weak explanatory power for outflows 
(Table  1 column 5, column  6; R2 = 0.02 
and R2 = 0.07, respectively). This might be 
due to other important factors—possible 
obstacles for highly skilled people to leave 
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Fig 1 | Corruption in 1990 and net migration flows.
Table 1 | Corruption and net migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent 
variable
Net Net Inflow Inflow Outflow Outflow
Corruption –0.0028a  
(0.001)
–0.0032a  
(0.001)
–0.0020a  
(0.000)
–0.0015a  
(0.000)
0.0009  
(0.001)
0.0018b  
(0.001)
GDP per capita No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.0073a 
(0.002)
0.0157 c 
(0.009)
0.0092a 
(0.001)
–0.0025 
(0.004)
0.0017  
(0.002)
0.0185b 
(0.008)
Observations 123 115 123 115 123 115
R2 0.1522 0.1570 0.2691 0.3184 0.0194 0.0702
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05 and cp < 0.1.
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the country, for example—and it suggests 
that corruption acts more as an obstacle for 
inflows than as an incentive for outflows.
In countries where corrupt people—through family ties, money or political affiliations—determine access to the job 
market, emigration of highly skilled labour 
is high and immigration of foreign talents is 
reduced, thus creating a net deficit. This 
effect could become increasingly problem-
atic in the long run, as it could lead to a 
continuous deterioration of human capital. 
It might induce a vicious circle leading to a 
decrease in productivity levels and worsen-
ing economic conditions. Hence, fighting 
corruption is not only an important short- 
and medium-term policy concern, but has 
even more relevant implications in the long 
run, as it might have long-lasting effects on 
human capital and economic growth.
Another implication of our analysis is 
that investments in education in corrupt 
countries might be relatively futile—unless 
the corruption is simultaneously dealt 
with—and could actually benefit other 
countries when people emigrate to more 
attractive job markets. Thus, investments in 
education in a country riddled with corrup-
tion might fade away and become a positive 
externality for others. The flexibility and 
mobility of labour markets means that poli-
cies aiming to enhance the levels of educa-
tion and skills for the native population are 
a necessary condition to build human capi-
tal, but are not sufficient alone. Govern-
ment policy should also focus on fighting 
corruption in order to create a fair labour 
market that is capable of keeping native 
workers and attracting  foreign talents.
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